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THE LAW AND POLITICS OF UNJUST ENRICHMENT
Dan Priel*
Abstract. One of the marked differences between American private law and the private
law of the rest of the common law world is the relative lack of interest in restitution in
the former compared with the enthusiasm for the subject in the latter. It has recently
been suggested that this difference has to do with the impact of legal realism on
American law. It was realism’s disdain for doctrinal analysis, it is said, which explains why
American scholars did not find the largely doctrinally-driven work on restitution very
interesting. In this essay I reject this argument as it fails to explain why American
scholars did not turn to non-doctrinal restitution scholarship in the same way they have
in areas like contract or tort. I offer a different explanation instead, one that derives from
the different understanding of the relationship between law and politics among
(mainstream) American and Commonwealth lawyers. I argue that it is this difference
that explains both why Commonwealth lawyers felt the need to develop restitution as a
solution to outstanding problems in other areas of private law, and why American
lawyers, in their different political tradition, had little need for restitution to perform this
role. I further argue that legal realism does not explain the difference between the U.S.
and the Commonwealth on this matter. On the contrary, I argue that the very different
fates of legal realism in the U.S. and in other parts of the common law world are
explained by the very same underlying differences between law and politics the essay
identifies.

For a reason which has never been fully explained, the Restatement and, in
the next generation, the work of Professors Jack Dawson and George
Palmer, failed to stir American lawyers and law schools to anything like the
degree to which Goff & Jones excited those in the Commonwealth of the
common law family.1

Introduction
One of the striking differences between American and Commonwealth work
on private law is the very different place accorded within them to the law of
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1
Peter Birks, The Foundations of Unjust Enrichment: Six Centennial Lectures
(Wellington: Victoria University Press, 2002) at 18-19.

restitution (or unjust enrichment).2 In contrast to the Commonwealth where
restitution is an area that attracts considerable scholarly attention, in the
United States the subject is an academic backwater. Describing the
American scene a few years ago John Langbein said that ‘[i]t is as though a
neutron bomb has hit the field—the monuments have been left standing,
but the people have been killed off.’3 Langbein’s explanation for this grim
state of affairs puts the blame on the ‘terrible toll that the realist movement
has inflicted on doctrinal study in post-Second World War USA.’4 More
recently, Chaim Saiman has advanced essentially the same view:
‘Commonwealth restitution discourse is largely a product of pre- or antirealist legal thought which generates scepticism from the mainstream
2

This first sentence already calls for three clarifications. First, while my main
focus and examples throughout the essay will come from English law, I believe what
I say applies to a certain degree to other Commonwealth jurisdictions. This is
because the first impetus for developing this area of law in the Commonwealth came
from English lawyers, and also because I think ideas about the relationship between
law and politics in England have had considerable influence on the political tradition
in the rest of the Commonwealth. Nonetheless, the fact that in recent years different
Commonwealth jurisdictions have been carving their own path may be an indication
of the decline even in these jurisdictions of the view that private law is a domain that
exists outside politics. See the discussion in section II.(b) below. Second, the term
private law, and the division between private and public law that it presupposes, is
not neutral. In the United States in particular many would argue that in an
important sense all law is public law. I use the term therefore only as shorthand for
contract, tort, property, and restitution without committing myself to any
substantive view on the question in what sense (if any) private law is private. Finally,
whether restitution and unjust enrichment form a distinct area of law is a subject of
considerable debate, which I intend to avoid here. I trust, however, that the terms
restitution and unjust enrichment are familiar enough to identify the subject-matter
I am concerned with in this essay.
3
John Langbein, ‘The Later History of Restitution’ in WR Cornish et al, eds,
Restitution Past, Present, and Future: Essays in Honour of Gareth Jones (Oxford:
Hart, 1998) 57 at 61.
4
Ibid at 62. Langbein adds another explanation that has to do with the rise of
economic analysis of law. But in a way it is the same explanation, for the rise and
success of economic analysis of law (as opposed to other interdisciplinary approaches
to law) is the other side of the decline of doctrinal scholarship. I would contend that
part of the success of economic analysis of law in the United States has to do with a
perception (whether justified or not) among American academic lawyers that it
could provide a degree of certainty that legal doctrine does not possess.
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American academic establishment.’5 In essence, the view is that legal realism
has led to the decline of respect for the sort of doctrinal analysis that has
been the driving force behind restitution in English and Commonwealth law.
This difference between American and English (and perhaps more
broadly Commonwealth) legal scholarship is a familiar one,6 but as an
explanation for the American lack of interest in restitution it suffers from a
fundamental flaw: it is true that doctrinal scholarship in the United States is
held in low regard, and it is thus not surprising why American legal scholars
did not take much interest in the largely doctrinal scholarship that
dominates academic work on restitution in the Commonwealth.7 But this, of
course, is true of restitution just as much as it is true of contract law, tort law
and many other areas of law which were once dominated by doctrinal
scholarship in the United States. Yet, as even a cursory glance at American
law journals reveals, there is wealth of new work in these areas of law, albeit
much of it in the style that some Commonwealth scholars call (with a whiff
of derision) ‘high theory.’ So to say that there is little restitution scholarship
in the U.S. because restitution scholarship is doctrinal is to beg the real
question, namely why there was no growth in non-doctrinal restitution
scholarship in the United States that has come to dominate even traditional
common law areas like contract and tort law.8 Langbein and Saiman’s
5

Chaim Saiman, ‘Restitution in America: Why the US Refuses to Join the
Global Restitution Party’ (2008) 28 Oxford J Legal Stud 99 at 103. This explanation
is accepted in Mitchell McInnes, ‘Resisting Temptations to “Justice”’ in Robert
Chambers et al., eds, Philosophical Foundations of the Law of Unjust Enrichment
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009) 100 at 127 [Philosophical Foundations];
Peter Birks, ‘Equity, Conscience, and Unjust Enrichment’ (1999) 23 Melb U L Rev 1
at 3, n.6.
6
See PS Atiyah, ‘American Tort Law in Crisis’ (1987) 7 Oxford J Legal Stud 279
at 280-04 and AWB Simpson, ‘Contract: The Twitching Corpse’ (1981) 1 Oxford J
Legal Stud 265 at 269-71 (1981).
7
What counts as ‘doctrinal’ scholarship as opposed to ‘theory’ may itself be the
subject of some contention. What is called ‘legal theory’ in Allan Beever & Charles
Rickett, ‘Interpretive Legal Theory and the Academic Lawyer’ (2005) 68 Mod L Rev
320, I consider doctrinal scholarship. As I see it, the difference is the degree to which
the scholar feels compelled to base his arguments on an understanding of legal
(especially judicial) materials.
8
In a different article Saiman added the ‘the lack of prestige of commercial law
in America’ as another reason. Chaim Saiman, ‘Restitution and the Production of
Legal Doctrine’ (2008) 65 Wash & Lee L Rev 993 at 1006; and similarly, Langbein

3

answer would convince only if for some reason restitution law somehow
resisted non-doctrinal scholarship. Langbein actually comes close to
suggesting this when he says that ‘[t]he study of restitution requires an
environment that treats doctrine with respect.’9 Langbein does not explain
why restitution is different from other areas of law, but on its face this claim
seems odd. Hanoch Dagan’s self-consciously realist and largely Americanorientated work on restitution illustrates this does not have to be the case.10
Langbein may have meant that by this statement that theoretical work on
law can only emerge against a background of developed doctrine. I have my
doubts about this view in general, as there are many examples of theoretical
work on law that is developed directly against doctrine, or to fill gaps in
doctrine, or is written with indifference to (or ignorance of) it. At any rate, in
the case of unjust enrichment, the doctrinal foundation was there. As
Langbein himself says, it was Americans who were the first in the common
law world to start thinking about unjust enrichment in a doctrinally
systematic way, and thanks to the efforts of a small group of scholars the
Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment has just been
published.11 All along, drafts and discussions for this and the previous
(unfinished) Restatement were published. These could have been grist to an

talks about the ‘marginalisation of private law,’ in Langbein, supra note 3 at 61. But,
once again, it is not difficult to find articles on contract, tort, bankruptcy, securities
regulation, corporate finance and other areas of private or commercial law in the
leading American journals.
9
Ibid at 62.
10
See Hanoch Dagan, The Law and Ethics of Restitution (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 2004) [Dagan, Restitution]; Hanoch Dagan, ‘Restitution’s Realism’
in Philosophical Foundations, supra note 5 at 54. Dagan is not alone. Though small in
comparison to other branches of private law there has been other non-doctrinal work
on restitution by American scholars such as Christopher Wonnell, ‘Replacing the
Unitary Principle of Unjust Enrichment’ (1996) 45 Emory LJ 153; Saul Levmore,
‘Explaining Restitution’ (1985) 71 Va L Rev 65; Richard A Epstein, ‘The Ubiquity of
the Benefit Principle’ (1994) 67 S Cal L Rev 1369. I explain this scholarship in note
90 and accompanying text below.
11
See Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment (2011). Now
that it is there, we have been promised a ‘restitution revival.’ See Caprice L. Roberts,
‘The Restitution Revival and the Ghosts of Equity’ (2011) 68 Wash & Lee L Rev
1027 at 1027, but it turns out that this revival is, for the time being, only an
expectation. See ibid at 1041.
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aspiring scholar’s mill, and yet most American lawyers remained
uninterested.
Saiman attempted to explain this divide by telling us that ‘the amount of
restitution law produced by a given [legal] system corresponds to the degree
that restitutionary remedies are conceptualized as correlating to specific legal
entitlements arising from property and contract. Hence, the less remedial
discretion allotted to the courts, the greater the need for substantive law of
restitution.’12 But this is like saying that the more restitution law is perceived
to be needed, the more of it will get produced. The question remains: why do
different legal systems have different perceived needs for such
developments? And for that matter, why are American lawyers less troubled
by remedial discretion?
It is these questions that this essay seeks to address. The answer I
propose for this puzzle has to do with the role unjust enrichment played in
English and Commonwealth law. I will argue that, for various reasons that
will be explained below, American academic lawyers had no need for unjust
enrichment; to English lawyers, by contrast, restitution law provided a
solution to otherwise intractable problems. To understand why this was the
case we need to look into a matter that seems to bear no relationship to the
question at hand, namely the way American law and English law conceive of
the relationship between law and politics. I argue that this difference leads to
distinct ways of understanding the shape and limits of acceptable doctrinal
innovation in the two legal systems. It is these differences, I will argue, that
provide a more satisfying explanation for the trajectories restitution law and
restitution scholarship took in these two countries.
If I am right about this, then this claim has broader significance than the
rather narrow point from which it emerges. In the familiar distinctions of
legal traditions American law is often classified with the rest of the law of the
English-speaking former British colonies as belonging to the ‘common law’
family. In some respects this classification is, of course, unobjectionable. But
it is no secret that in some respects American law has taken a different path
from the rest of the common law. Especially in the area of private law,
Commonwealth lawyers, both academic and practicing, seem to implicitly
accept this parting of ways by showing less interest in American court
decisions, which (despite their much larger number) are much less
frequently cited or analyzed in Commonwealth textbooks than the decisions
from other Commonwealth jurisdictions; American legal scholarship in these
12

Saiman, supra note 8 at 1039-40.
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areas is also, with a few exceptions, largely ignored. The essay seeks to
provide part of an answer as to why. Interestingly, what emerges from it is
that at least in this area, the familiar common law/civil law divide (one that
some English doctrinal scholars rely on in seeking to restrict the influence or
borrowings from other European legal systems) is misleading. In some
important respects, English law is now much closer to European civil law
than to American law.
One caveat: my account attempts to explain the different fates of
restitution in English and American law as, in part, resulting from different
fundamental perceptions of the relationship between law and politics. These
differences are most visible from a certain distance; move closer and all
patterns disappear, move away and differences vanish. No doubt one could
find representatives of what I describe as the typical English approach on the
American side, and vice versa; in fact, later in this essay I extend my
explanation to account for some of the debates among English restitution
lawyers. Nevertheless, I believe that the patterns I describe reflect are real,
and that they are crucial for understanding the different fates of restitution
in the two countries.
Here is how my argument will unfold. I start with briefly presenting a
sketch of the significance of ideas to legal thought, and will explain how this
perspective helps in understanding the sort of explanation I will be offering
here. In section II I explain the problem that restitution was meant to solve
in English law. I argue that restitution was the means for solving existing
problems that doctrine within other areas of law proved incapable of solving.
This answer, however, raises an immediate question: why was there a need to
develop these solutions outside these particular areas of law, instead of
correcting the problems in existing doctrine? Section III begins to answer
this question by discussing an issue that looks at first far removed from
doctrinal problems in private law, namely the way in which different legal
systems conceptualize the relationship between law and politics. I argue
there that certain ways of understanding this relationship constrain the sorts
of answers available within English doctrine. In section IV I apply this
distinction to the question and restitution and show how it explains the
different fate of restitution in English and American law, both at the
doctrinal level and in the work of scholars.

6

I. The Power of Ideas
The familiar version of the modern history of unjust enrichment in English
law has the individual efforts of Robert Goff and Gareth Jones, of Peter Birks,
and perhaps a few others scholars, as major turning points in changing an
area of law that many doubted even existed into the most active area for new
doctrinal scholarship. In this story, had it not been for the perseverance of
these authors, English restitution law might have looked quite different
today, as powerful voices were opposed to the addition of restitution (or
unjust enrichment) to the list of recognized legal categories. Though in part
true (and significant), this account is in many respects an example of the
fallacy of post hoc, ergo propter hoc. We know what happened, and so we tell
the story as though it was bound to happen. But compare this story to a
different one: In the late 1970s a group of scholars tried to import the then
emerging ideas of law and economics into English legal scholarship. These
studies were published in all the leading English journals, but what turned
into a flood in the U.S. has had virtually no impact on English law. Had
economic analysis caught on in Britain, no doubt these articles would have
been hailed now as early precursors of what became a major development. As
there was no such development, there is no story to tell. The very different
fates of restitution and economic analysis show that we need to look
elsewhere for the missing ingredient in our story, the one that explains why
certain ideas have impact while others do not.
The same question arises closer to our subject: had restitution been a
success in the United States, William Keener, the author of the first Englishlanguage treatise on the subject, and even more so Austin Scott and Warren
Seavey, the reporters of the 1937 Restatement of Restitution, would have
been considered visionary path-breakers, minor heroes in the pantheon of
American law. But as restitution languished at the dark corners of American
law and their work was neglected, the names of Keener, Scott and Seavey
have been forgotten. They are now familiar only to the small coterie of
scholars who keep the feeble flame of American restitution law alive. It is not
enough, then, to show that new ideas started with someone. They always do.
The question is what makes certain ideas stick. The rest of the essay
attempts to explain what that extra ingredient is in the context of
restitution.
Before I turn to that question, I must preface my account with a short
explanation of a more general kind. Legal systems are not just the sum of
norms (rules, principles). A crucial element in understanding legal systems is

7

what might be called the ‘ideology’ of the legal system. I use the term
ideology in a non-pejorative sense, and it is not limited to (although it
includes) the political orientation of the legal system to non-legal ideas:
different legal systems can both be politically ‘liberal’ and yet have a very
different ideology in other regards. Thus, ideology will include attitudes
regarding the openness of the legal system, the role of courts and lawyers in
the legal system, the relative weight a given legal system tends to give to
certainty over other considerations, and so on. This ideology will affect
foundational questions, such as the appropriate issues for the legal system to
deal with and the appropriate ways of dealing with them, as well as more
mundane issues like the appropriate methods for interpreting legal materials,
the amount of deference that should be given to other branches of
government and so on.13 This is why legal ideology is both powerful but easy
to miss. As the ideology of a legal system is part of the background of all the
law, it is easy to overlook how contingent it is and to treat local attitudes as
part of the order of the world. And because in one way or another it affects
all aspects of a legal system, it is often very difficult to change.
This has important implications for understanding the limits of legal
change. It is because of the ideological component of legal systems that good
norms from other legal systems often do not travel well between
jurisdictions. Ignoring ideology, a lawmaker seeking to improve the laws of
her jurisdiction could simply look for those norms best supported by reason,
or to ideas coming from any existing or imaginary jurisdiction, and all will be
equally good candidates for importation. In reality, this is not often the case.
New legal ideas have staying power to the extent that they can be made to fit
within the existing ideology of a legal system. What this means is that they
will be treated as valuable when they are perceived to offer adequate solutions
to (what are taken to be) open problems. Ideas that satisfy only one of these
two conditions are likely to be considered (at best) interesting for ‘academic’
discussion but irrelevant in practice.
Once a solution is incorporated in a legal system, it becomes part of the
background against which new ideas and new solutions to other problems are
assessed. Because new ideas are incorporated to the extent that they fit the
existing legal ideology, quite often legal change will operate through a kind of
feedback loop mechanism that tends to deepen the ideological path to which
a legal system is already committed. It is through this mechanism that initial
13

C.f. Anthony Ogus, ‘The Economic Basis of Legal Culture: Networks and
Monopolization’ (2002) 22 Oxford J Legal Stud 419 at 421-23.

8

small differences between legal systems can become more pronounced with
time until at a certain point meaningful exchange of ideas between the legal
systems becomes difficult.14 Just as the geographical separation of two groups
belonging to a single species can lead to speciation, the separation of legal
systems can lead to legal system speciation. Because the reshaping and
changing of legal systems happens through conscious efforts rather than
random change, reversing course is easier in the domain of legal ideas than in
the biological world, but it is noteworthy that when such efforts at reversing
courses are made, the change is often accompanied by efforts to expose, or
invent (the two are not always easily distinguished), a shared origin.15
In what follows I will try to demonstrate that it is the ideology of English
and American law, and in particular their fundamental, and fundamentally
different, attitudes to the relationship between law and politics, that explain
the different fates of restitution law in these countries.

II. Unjust Enrichment as the Solution to the Problem of
Unjust Doctrine
Since much of the Commonwealth doctrinal scholarship on unjust
enrichment has been in one way or another a development of, or a reaction
to, the work of Peter Birks it would be helpful to start with him. Birks was the
first to admit that many of his most fundamental ideas about law in general
and restitution law in particular were derived from Roman law. What made
his ideas so influential, however, was that he did not develop these ideas
within the niche area of Roman law scholarship. Rather, for the most part he
translated them to concepts that made them comprehensible to the English
common lawyer. He argued that these ideas could provide doctrinally
14

More precisely, when ideological differences between legal systems are initially
small, unequal access to new ideas which reinforce the existing differences can result
in the legal systems drifting away from each other. Geography, language, and
political ties have traditionally been the source of unequal access to new ideas.
Globalization and technology may overcome some of these barriers, but not
necessarily others. At the same time, they may exacerbate the problem of
information glut that often leads to discrimination in favour of more local or more
similar ideas. There is, of course, much more to be said about these issues.
15
In the European context see Reinhard Zimmermann, Roman Law,
Contemporary Law, European Law: The Civilian Tradition Today (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2001) at 107-14.
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respectable solutions to existing legal problems in English law. Though he
never wrote a treatise on restitution, his work followed a path that was
familiar to contemporary English private lawyers: it was based on ‘look[ing]
downwards to the cases,’16 and was conceived as a non-political investigation
into ‘lawyers’ law.’
These methodological commitments led to two substantive principles
that were at the heart of Birks’s thinking on unjust enrichment. The first was
that unjust enrichment is a member in full standing of the law obligations
alongside contract and tort. By this what Birks meant was not merely that
unjust enrichment law was a useful way of organizing material for
pedagogical or explanatory purposes, but that unjust enrichment represented
a fundamental legal category, one that corresponded to the real divisions of
the law.17 The second commitment was that unjust enrichment, despite its
name, has relatively little to do with justice. Birks could not have put this
point more strongly than he did: with almost no loss of meaning, Birks tells
us, ‘unjust enrichment’ could be called ‘pink enrichment.’18
I wish to present a picture that challenges both points. I believe there are
no true legal categories over and above the categories we create. The way
courts classify cases may, for certain purposes, be a useful way of classifying
them. But in other instances different classifications can be more useful.
There is nothing wrong with classifying the topic of vitiated contracts within
contract law, or that of gain-based remedies for wrongs under tort law; there
16

Peter Birks, An Introduction to the Law of Restitution, paperback ed (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1989) at 23; see also ibid at 99.
17
See generally Peter Birks, ‘Property and Unjust Enrichment: Categorical
Truths’ [1997] NZ L Rev 623; see also Nicholas J McBride, ‘The Classification of
Obligations and Legal Education’ in Peter Birks, ed, The Classification of Obligations
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997) 71; McInnes, supra note 5 at 101, 114 (complaining
about the principles of the law of restitution being ‘manipulated’ or ‘abused’).
Saiman also seems to hold the same view when he complains that ‘[l]acking a
formalized “law of restitution” cases of mistaken payment were analyzed ‘through
the eyes of tort and contract.’ Chaim Saiman, ‘Restating Restitution: A Case of
Contemporary Common Law Conceptualism’ (2007) 52 Vill L Rev 487 at 524. But
this is a mistake only if one believes that legal categories reflect some real,
conceptual truths.
18
See Peter Birks, Unjust Enrichment, 2nd ed (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2005)
at 274-75; Birks, supra note 16 at 19-23. Others expressed similar views. See Andrew
Burrows, The Law of Restitution, 3rd ed (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011) at 4,
86-87; McInnes, supra note 5.
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is also nothing wrong with classifying them for different purposes as part of
the law of restitution. Legal scholars do not discover categories that are true,
but rather articulate categories that are useful. Of course some categories
may be more useful than others, but even here, the useful classifications for a
lawyer representing a hospital may be very different from those useful for a
university lecturer.19
The second point is that contrary to the view that unjust enrichment has
little to do with justice, I contend that a main reason why restitution law
flourished in English law is because it provided a doctrinally respectable way
of avoiding what were perceived to be unjust results in other areas of law. It
is for this reason that restitution law looks so much like the result of a looting
campaign in other legal categories: a bit from contract, a chunk from tort,
something from property with a dash of equity. A couple of examples will
help substantiate this point. Consider, first, the simple, ‘core case’ of unjust
enrichment, mistaken payment.20 Why does this case require legal
intervention? The answer must include two elements. The first is that the
outcome where the recipient retains the money is deemed ‘wrong.’ By wrong
I do not mean, of course, legally wrong; I mean a situation that is in some
inarticulate sense morally problematic. Now, there can be all kinds of
elaborate theories—having to do with autonomy, self-determination,
economic efficiency, fairness—to explain why such a situation in which the
payee retains the mistaken payment is ‘wrong,’ and these different
explanations may lead to real differences in certain contexts, but Birks
presents this case as an axiom, one that requires no explanation and cannot
be questioned.
Assume he is right in treating this is a core case. The question for the
lawyer then is how the law should deal with these kinds of situation. Unjust
enrichment scholars have argued that the doctrine of unjust enrichment is
necessary for handling such cases, but it is not immediately clear why. It is
obvious that ownership is not always matched by possession, and that there is
nothing wrong with that: books could not be lent and houses could not be
rented if that were not the case. But such separation of ownership from
19

It may be due to humans’ internal wiring certain legal divisions will appear to
most or even all humans as more ‘natural.’ Showing this, however, will require appeal
to pre-legal psychological categories, not to the ‘internal’ coherence of certain legal
categories.
20
The designation of this as the core case of unjust enrichment is in Birks, supra
note 18 at 6-7.
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possession usually requires a voluntary act on part of the owner; when such a
voluntary act is not present, then (typically) the owner has a claim for
retaining possession quite simply as one of the ‘incidents of ownership.’21
The basic idea invoked here—’This is mine! Give it back to me’—is so
simple that toddlers begin to grasp it when they are about fourteen months
old.22 Therefore, a possible way of handing cases of mislaid, forgotten, and
mistakenly-given property is by appealing to this simple idea, something that
even the most enthusiastic supporters of unjust enrichment admit.23
Why then is unjust enrichment invoked in the case of mistaken
payment? The reason is certain complications introduced by the law: there
are situations in which title passes despite the fact that the conditions we
commonly think of as the reasons for the transfer of property (e.g., voluntary
action) have not been met. This mismatch between our intuitive ideas of
property and the requirements of property law is deemed by us to be unjust,
not (merely) in the legal sense of invoking a restitutionary claim, but in the
everyday meaning of the term: it is considered morally problematic, it is
considered ‘wrong.’ For whatever reason, many people think that
absentmindedness should not normally suffice for losing one’s property
regardless of niceties about legal title. When this point is recognized, it is
natural to go back to the very same proprietary ideas that were relied upon
before. What explains the doctrine here, what distinguishes cases in which
21

See Tony Honoré, ‘Ownership’ in Making Law Bind: Essays Legal and
Philosophical (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987) 161 at 167 (‘The owner … has
characteristically a battery of remedies in order to obtain, keep, and if necessary get
back the thing owed [to him],’ which include ‘the claim for specific restitution of
goods, and the vindication’).
22
See Maris Monitz Rodgon & Sue E Rashman, ‘Expression of Owner-Owned
Relationships among Holophrastic 14- to 32-Month-Old Children’ (1976) 47 Child
Dev 1219; c.f. OW Holmes, ‘The Path of the Law’ (1897) 10 Harv L Rev 457 at 477
(‘Sir Henry Maine has made it fashionable to connect the archaic notion of property
with prescription. But the connection is further back than the first recorded history.
It is the nature of man’s mind.’).
23
See Lionel Smith, ‘Unjust Enrichment, Property, and the Structure of Trusts’
(2000) 116 Law Q Rev 412 at 422-23 (although oddly he relies on Occam’s razor to
conclude that such claims should be treated as unjust enrichment claim); Graham
Virgo, The Principles of the Law of Restitution, 2nd ed (Oxford: Oxford University,
2006) at 570. Even those wishing to give a more minimal place to property-based
claims, give them room in these cases: Birks, supra note 18 at 64; Birks, supra note 16
at 50-51; Burrows, supra note 18 at 169.
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the payment should be returned from cases (such as those involving gifts) in
which it should not, has to do with our underlying ideas of property. In the
case of a mistaken payment there was no conscious, willed decision to give
the money to another; in the case of a cash gift, there was. And so even in
these cases, ‘where unjust enrichment is most needed,’24 it turns out that
unjust enrichment does not explain the law’s treatment of mistaken
payment. If asked to describe this situation we would say ‘the money in
question did not really belong to the payee, and therefore if she retained it
should be unjustly enriched,’ not the other way around.
My other example is briefer and more specific. It is the problem known
as battle of the forms. In such a case what typically happens is that two
parties try to contract by exchanging their standard form contracts. One
party sends its own form, to which the other replies with its form.
Performance then begins without the second form being formally accepted.
The problem arises when the latter form is different in some important
elements from the first one. Traditional offer-and-acceptance analysis
classifies the second form as a rejection of the original offer and a new
counteroffer that was never accepted. In most cases matters proceed without
a hitch, but, obviously, sometimes they do not. What is to be done in such
cases? When a case like this reached the English Court of Appeal the bold
spirit of Lord Denning had no difficulty in asserting that the ‘traditional
analysis … is out of date,’25 and he had no qualms about departing from it.
The other judges agreed with him on the result, but they sought to do so by
maintaining the traditional rules. What is interesting and important for the
argument I will develop below is that in England there was academic support
for the view that the right way to solve this problem is by appeal to
restitution.26 Though the issue is different, the structure of the argument is

24

Lionel Smith, ‘Restitution: The Heart of Corrective Justice’ (2001) 79 Tex L
Rev 2115 at 2141 n 106.
25
Butler Machine Tool Co. Ltd. v Ex-cell-O Corporation (England) Ltd (1977),
[1979] 1 WLR 401 at 404 (CA).
26
See Ewan McKendrick, ‘The Battle of the Forms and the Law of Restitution’
(1988) 8 Oxford J Legal Stud 197; Birks, supra note 16 at 466-67, crisply exemplifies
the argument I will develop below: ‘If the courts abandoned the attempt to discover
a contract by rigidly applying, or distorting, the rules of offer and acceptance and
instead concluded that there was no contract … transfers made under the abortive
contract could … be handled through non-contractual (restitutionary) request and
acceptance.’
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the same: we have a legal doctrine that leads to what is perceived as a
problematic result, and unjust enrichment is invoked to solve the problem.
Limits of space preclude me from offering other examples, but I believe
that for virtually every case in which unjust enrichment has been invoked as
justification, a similar story could be told: a problem with a doctrine in some
area of law, and appeal to the ‘principle against unjust enrichment’ to solve
it.27

III. The Political Foundations of Doctrinal Scholarship
The last section considered some of the cases that doctrinal lawyers say
belong to the law of unjust enrichment in order to show that the doctrine
was used to circumvent unjust results created by other doctrines. This claim,
however, raises an immediate problem: if this is indeed the case, why was
there a need for invoking unjust enrichment? It would have been easier to
simply change the existing problematic doctrine instead of adding a further
doctrinal layer in the shape of restitution law. Why have scholars opted for
complex and circuitous solutions based on the vague idea of unjust
enrichment when easier routes were available? The doctrinal answer offered
to such a challenge is that ‘it is trite law that in a situation like this property

27

Though they do not always present it in this way, one can see this by reading
the work of unjust enrichment skeptics. See e.g., Peter Jaffey, The Nature and Scope
of Restitution: Vitiated Transfers, Imputed Contracts, and Disgorgement (Oxford:
Hart, 2000); Steve Hedley, A Critical Introduction to Restitution (London:
Butterworths, 2001); Joachim Dietrich, Restitution: A New Perspective (Leichhardt:
Federation Press, 1998). This does not cover all the cases that appear now in books
on ‘restitution,’ but the remaining cases (such as those dealing with vitiated
contracts) are cases of redrawing of boundaries between different areas of law. Here
the restitutionary analysis is superfluous: the only reason why it could be unjust not
to return what one received as a result of a vitiated contract is some other rule (one
presumably having to do with property) that would explain why it is wrong to retain
whatever one received. It is then failing to comply with that rule that implies unjust
enrichment. But if that is the case, then unjust enrichment simply piggybacks on
that other rule.
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passes to the payee.’28 But this does not explain why restitution is needed: all
law, even trite law, can be changed.29
I have already described in general terms what I take the right answer to
be: the solutions adopted had to be perceived as adequate solution to an open
problem, and for reasons that I will try to explain below unjust enrichment
appeared an adequate solution whereas changing existing legal doctrine did
not. This at first may seem odd. If there is something that common lawyers
pride themselves (and their legal tradition) on, it is their pragmatism and
flexibility, and their dislike for excessive (‘German’) conceptualism.30 Against
this background the rigid attitude suggested here may appear at first quite
surprising. What could explain it?
There is what might be called the ‘sinister’ answer, offered by Jeremy
Bentham and reiterated later by many others: lawyers adopt complex rules
because it is in their interest to make sure that their services are needed. I
have no doubt that there are cases to which Bentham’s idea is applicable, but
I think this case is not one of them, not least because the concern with
restitution has, at least until recently, largely been an academic affair which
actually had little impact on legal practice.31 Furthermore, this argument
cannot explain the difference between English and American law on the
matter. Therefore, I wish to suggest a different explanation, and that is that a
different understanding of the relationship between law and politics in these
two legal systems has led to very different views on the limits on acceptable
legal change. More specifically, my argument will be that in some important
sense the simple solutions offered above are unavailable to English lawyers,
because they would be considered in some sense political, and as such not
legal and therefore inadequate. This view depends on a particular
understanding of the relationship between law and politics, one according to
which the two domains are largely separate and therefore some possible
solutions to legal problems are not solutions that lawyers can properly
28

Burrows, supra note 18 at 30. This point is equally applicable to mistaken
payment.
29
This is effectively the answer given by, for example, Charlie Webb, ‘Property,
Unjust Enrichment and Defective Transfers’ in Philosophical Foundations, supra
note 5 at 335, 355-58.
30
See generally PS Atiyah, Pragmatism and Theory in English Law (London:
Stevens and Sons, 1987).
31
At least if we are to believe Hugh Collins, ‘Legal Classifications as the
Products of Knowledge Systems’, in The Classification of Obligations, supra note 17
at 57, 68.
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suggest. By contrast, in the United States, where the prevailing view on the
relationship between law and politics is fundamentally different, there was
no similar barrier to adopting the simpler solutions.

(a) Two Views on the Relationship between Law and Politics
My central argument is that English law and American law have a different
ideology on the question of the relationship between law and politics. Now if
by politics we mean questions concerning the distribution of resources in
society, then few will doubt that law, even private law, is in some sense tied
to politics. In another sense, there seems to be general agreement that all
law, including public law, is separate from politics. All judges, for example,
insist that in deciding cases, they are following the law, not their personal
political opinions; and all agree that in some sense law is undermined when it
is infiltrated by politics.
And yet there is an intuitive sense in which American courts are touched
by politics in a way that judges in the Commonwealth are not. Throughout
American history courts have often been asked to decide on politically
controversial questions (such as slavery, abortion, health care, same-sex
marriage). There is also a burgeoning academic industry, frequently
discussed also in the press, that analyzes court decisions according to the
judges’ perceived political orientation. In the Commonwealth, to varying
degrees, the courts do not play that role, and it is much rarer to consider
judges’ open in openly political terms.
This difference has its roots, in part, in the different political traditions
of England (and through it the rest of the Commonwealth) and the U.S, and
the relative role of law in political debates.32 One of the most distinctive
marks of American law and scholarship of the last century has been attempts
to spell out ways by which American courts could somehow be able to police
and limit political discourse without entering into the forbidden territory of
politics. Various ‘theories’ of judicial review were concerned with
demarcating a proper role for courts when deciding on politically
controversial cases. The search for ‘neutral principles,’ the distinction
32

The American story is in fact more complicated, as the courts were relatively
uninvolved in political matters during the nineteenth century. See Mark Graber,
‘Resolving Political Questions into Judicial Questions: Tocqueville’s thesis Revisited’
(2004) 21 Const Comm 485; see also note 54 below. The major change has taken
place with the emergence of the regulatory state that was marked by attempts of the
courts to make sure the government does not exceed its given powers.
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between principles and policies, the limitation of judicial review to
infringements on the right to participate in the democratic process are all
examples of this attempt. Similarly, the emergence of distinct ‘theories’ of
statutory and constitutional interpretation were to a large extent a response
to the need to keep law outside politics while dealing with and deciding on
politically controversial matters.33 The hallmark of the American approach—
regardless of the very different solution proposed—has been the attempt to
develop doctrinal and institutional tools for allowing courts some
engagement with political discourse without getting embroiled in political
debates.
It is no coincidence that all these debates have had, especially until
recent years, very little resonance in the rest of the common law world. The
simple reason is that there was no need for them, because the English (and
Commonwealth) approach to the challenge of politics has been quite
different. The prevailing view here has been that law is the antithesis of
politics, and therefore maintaining the distinction between law and politics
requires identifying the two distinct domains of law and politics and keeping
them, as much as possible, separate.34 Dicey’s influential interpretation of
33

This, for instance is a justification given for turning to originalism. See
Antonin Scalia, ‘Originalism: The Lesser Evil’ (1989) 57 U Cin L Rev 849 at 854,
863-64.
34
See e.g. Birks, supra note 5 at 21 (‘[Law] can perhaps never be perfectly
autonomous. That is, it can never be perfectly detached from the judge’s own
perception of right and wrong. But it must be as autonomous as it can be made’); c.f.
Burrows, supra note 18 at 4 (asserting he is concerned with ‘what the law regards as
unjust enrichment’ and not what ‘any one individual or commentator may think is
unjust enrichment’). Notice that the attitude expressed here is that the alternative
to law is personal opinion. This approach thus is exactly at odds with the efforts of
many American scholars to distinguish ‘ordinary’ politics (which courts should not
engage in) from an elevated form of politics that is the right domain of courts. See
Dan Priel, ‘Is There One Right Answer to the Question of the Nature of Law?’ in WJ
Waluchow & Stefan Sciaraffa, eds, The Philosophical Foundations of the Nature of
Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012) 322 at 331-34.
One of the best known proponents of this view has been Ronald Dworkin. It is
for this reason that it is, I think, a mistake to suggest, as Duncan Sheehan does in
‘Implied Contract and the Taxonomy of Unjust Enrichment’, in Paula Giliker, ed,
Re-Examining Contract and Unjust Enrichment: Anglo-Canadian Perspectives
(Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2007) 185 at 192-95, 211-12, that Birks’s project is
‘Dworkinian.’ It is true that Birks presented his views on restitution as an
interpretation of existing law, a view that superficial similarity to Dworkin’s claim
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Parliamentary supremacy has been taken to mean that beyond relatively
undemanding tests of legal warrant, courts did not interfere with political
decisions. Instead of devising complicated means for distinguishing
permissible from impermissible engagements with politics, the mainstream
view has been that the only approach that maintains democratic values and
that guarantees the legitimacy of courts, is that they altogether avoid
politically controversial questions.
A further means for keeping law separate from politics has been an
invigorated distinction between private law and public law. This distinction
was not traditionally central to the common law. Indeed, the belief that there
was no such distinction in English law was at one point considered a central
distinction between the common law and civil law traditions (as well as a
barely concealed basis for pride in the superiority of the common law).35 But
in recent years, perhaps as a result of a sense that politics was increasingly
intertwined in public law, the divide between public law and private law has
emerged as a fundamental category of Commonwealth common law. Part of
the motivation for separating private law from public law has been the view
that private law is, necessarily, non-political.36 On this view law, or at least
that answers to new legal questions must be found from within law. This, however, is
not a distinctly Dworkinian idea, but rather one that has a long history in the
common law. See Alan Cromartie, ‘The Idea of Common Law as Custom’ in
Amanda Perreau-Saussine & James Bernard Murphy, eds, The Nature of Customary
Law: Legal, Historical and Philosophical Perspectives (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2007) 203. Dworkin’s novelty lies in his attempt to reconcile this
traditional view of the common law with the view that ‘[l]aw … is deeply and
thoroughly political.’ Ronald Dworkin, A Matter of Principle (Cambridge, Mass:
Harvard University Press, 1985) at 146 By contrast, Birks’s project is premised on
exactly the opposite view, that finding the solution to open legal problems within the
law is essential for keeping law and politics separate. See Peter Birks, ‘Equity in the
Modern Law: An Exercise in Taxonomy’ (1996) 26 UW Austl L Rev 1 at 97-99.
35
See JWF Allison, A Continental Distinction in the Common Law: A Historical
and Comparative Perspective on English Public Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1996) at 1 (‘until this century, the distinction [between private and public law] was
little known in England’); c.f. AV Dicey, Lectures Introductory to the Study of the
Constitution (London: Macmillan, 1885) at 177-79, 199-202 (arguing that one of the
meanings of the English rule of law is that all claims of individuals against the
government must be framed as ordinary common law claims).
36
See e.g. Birks, supra note 34 at 97-99 (arguing that development of private law
should be given to ‘legal experts’ in order to prevent the ‘politicisation’ of the law
and ‘the realist destruction of legal science’); Andrew Burrows, Understanding the
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private law, is corrupted when its rules are subjected to politics.37 A clinically
clean statement of this view is found in Ernest Weinrib’s provocative
suggestion that ‘the purpose of private law is simply to be private law.’38
To a lawyer seriously committed to this view, these words are not just a
slogan. One of their practical implications is that they impose a limit on the
permissible sources the lawyer should consult in her work. It is not simply
that looking at the work of economists or philosophers is unnecessary for
understanding and developing the law; for a proponent of this view, in an
important sense it is wrong to do, for it is within the law that one need and
should look for determining the content of legal change and it is legal
materials that determine its acceptable limits. Another important aspect of
this view is that private law is the domain of expert lawyers and should
largely be left outside democratic decision-making. It should not be
legislated (for proponents of this view, the epitome of politics),39 and to the
extent that it is legislatively changed, the change should be the result of work
from a non-political (and doctrinal-lawyer-dominated) Law Commission.40
The most important practical implication of this view for our purposes is
that legal change is considered a different kind of beast from political change
Law of Obligations: Essays on Contract, Tort and Restitution (Oxford: Hart, 1998) at
122 (‘To my way of thinking, for the common law to react according to the political
fad of the moment would be to contradict its very essence; contract, tort and
restitution rest on fundamental long-term values that, while evolving and adapting
to new conditions over the course of time, and while influenced by long-term
policies, should be immune from short-term party politics.’). What Burrows calls
‘political fad’ others call democracy.
37
The intellectual background for this group was provided in the very influential
work (in these circles) of Weinrib. See, for example, Ernest J Weinrib, The Idea of
Private Law (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995), where many of these
themes are discussed.
38
Ibid at 21; accord Robert Stevens, Torts and Rights (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2007) at 326 (‘it is meaningless to talk of the law of torts having a function or
goal at all’). Not surprisingly, both scholars explicitly insist that law (or at least
private law) is autonomous from politics. See Weinrib, supra note 37 at 210-14;
Robert Stevens, ‘Torts’ in Louis Blom-Cooper et al, eds, The Judicial House of Lords
1876-2009 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009) 629 at 651-52.
39
As Lord Radcliffe put it ‘[l]awyers tend to regard statute law as not quite the
equivalent of real law.’ Viscount Radcliffe, ‘The Place of Law Courts in Society’ in
Not in Feather Beds: Some Collected Papers (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1968) 27 at
30.
40
Burrows, supra note 36 at 136, 166.
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of the law. Whereas the latter is (especially within the British system) in
principle still largely unconstrained by law, the former is governed by rules on
what count as ‘permissible’ moves. To use a word much favoured by
proponents of the former view, legal change must have a certain form. These
impose some limits on the outcomes one can reach, but they also impose
less-discussed limits on the way to get to them.
This does not yet explain the difference between legal and political
change. Isn’t it obvious that change in the law must be grounded in some
normative idea, and as such must be grounded in political arguments? To
proponents of the model of law and politics discussed here the answer is ‘no’:
to maintain the idea of law as an autonomous discipline it must be that legal
change—one based on the law’s own ‘self-understanding,’ on its own
resources—be different from change based on any other discipline. One of
the most familiar ways in which this idea is articulated is in the distinction
courts always make between the kind of changes in the law they can bring
about and the change that can only be brought about by the legislature. It is
often thought that such explanations are based on the worry that the courts
will overstep into the legitimate domain of an elected Parliament, that is,
that they will violate democratic legitimacy. And though this is true, quite
often the focus of the explanation is subtly but importantly different: such
unacceptable change is problematic because it requires stepping outside the
legitimate powers of courts. These are not two sides of the same coin. It is
not simply that the power of legal change by the courts ends where that of
the legislature begins; on this view there are independent considerations,
having to do with the nature of (private) law, that limit courts’ permissible
action that have little to do with democracy.
The fundamental difference between the two has to do with the
difference between acts of will and arguments of reason.41 Political change—
because it derives its authority from democratic principles—is the domain of
acts of will; by contrast, legal change—because its authority can come on this
view only from within the law itself—is acceptable only if it comes from a
reinterpretation of legal materials. As such, on this view legal change is
acceptable only if in some sense it does not change the law at all. A politician
seeking to change the law can simply declare: ‘the law will be better if we
change it in this way.’ Odd as it may sound, from the perspective considered
here this simple and seemingly obvious line of argument is not available to
41

See MJ Detmold, ‘Law as Practical Reason’ (1989) 48 Cambridge LJ 436 at
437-55 for an instructive discussion.
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the lawyer, because what counts as ‘better’ is a political question, something
on which people of different political persuasions will hold different views.
This is why the lawyer must resort to a different kind of argument, one
compelled by the legal materials themselves. Even when reaching the same
outcome (and for that matter, even if the lawyer happens to share the view
with the politician that the outcome would be ‘better’), this can never be a
reason for the decision.
In theory at least the difference between the two approaches is vast,42
and it explains some fundamental aspects of doctrinal legal practice. This,
for example, is the foundation of the old idea—to which one finds support
among doctrinal lawyers even today—that judges and lawyers never change
the law, only discover it.43 Even when not adopting such a view, the idea of
abolishing a doctrine is treated with suspicion, for in some sense it is not an
acceptable move in the ‘game,’ it suggests a kind of breakdown of the rules.
It is perhaps for this reason that the most natural (perhaps the only available)
route for doing that is by arguing that the decision being overruled was
‘wrongly decided’ in the sense that it could not have been reached on any
reasonable interpretation of existing legal materials at the time it was handed
down.44 Doing that makes it possible to ‘return’ the law from the wrong path
it has taken to the true course it should always have taken, thereby seemingly
not changing the law.
I need less space to describe the mainstream view among American
lawyers, because it is quite simply more-or-less the opposite. The starting
point for debate among American lawyers is that in an important sense law is
part of politics. Law is a means for achieving political ends, law can be used
42

Whether the difference is significant in reality is another matter. Against my
distinction between legal and political change mentioned in the text, we can
rephrase the familiar critique of formalism as the claim that in reality the difference
between legal and political change is small, because legal materials are loose enough,
so it is possible to construct a legally credible argument for a wide range of different
outcomes.
43
See Peter Birks, ‘Mistakes of Law’ (2000) 53 Curr Legal Probs 205 at 217-18,
where Birks states that while judges are permitted to bring about interpretative
change, they cannot abolish existing rules in the way legislature do. Birks says this
long after the Practice Statement (Judicial Precedent), [1966] 1 WLR 1234, that
allowed the House of Lords to depart from its earlier decisions. For an interesting
discussion see Detmold, supra note 41 at 440-41.
44
See e.g. Murphy v Brentwood District Council (1990), [1991] 1 AC 398 at 471,
HL (Eng); c.f. R v R (1991), [1992] 1 AC 599 at 612, HL (Eng).
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to pursue political ends, and legal institutions are forum of political debate.
This is clearly the case in contentious, highly visible constitutional cases, but
it is also the case in ‘private’ law cases. It reflects a philosophy that rejects the
divide between reason and will and conceives all of it as having its source in
the will of the lawmakers.45 Underneath this rather abstract idea one finds a
whole range of different views running the gamut from the view that law is
politics with an odd jargon to the view that law is a kind of idealized politics.
But the view that law is separate or autonomous from politics is, for the most
part, treated as not just wrong, but naïve and even dangerous.
Because law in the U.S. is understood in more overtly political terms,
legal change, including the abolition of existing doctrines, is easier to explain
in more direct terms: if the law no longer serves whatever goal is set for it, it
should be changed. Of course, even within this approach courts operate
under various constraints, and judges do not simply decide cases any way
they want. The difference is, however, that within this approach the limits of
legal argument and legal change are thought to be determined on the basis of
political or institutional analysis, not on the basis of a fixed conceptual
division between law and politics. True, even in American law there are those
who call for greater ‘formalism’ (for our purposes, greater separation between
law and politics) but unlike the conceptual approach, these calls typically
invoke explicitly political or institutional arguments in support of their
position.46
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A clear rejection of the divide between reason and will, which reflects the very
different understanding of the divide between law and politics, is found in Erie
Railroad Co v Tompkins, (1938) 304 US 64 at 79, endorsing Black & White Cab v
Black & Yellow Cab, (1928) 276 US 518 at 532-34 (Holmes J., dissenting). There is a
corresponding distinction between the two views with regard to the role they assume
law plays in practical reasoning. On one view law is there to free people from the
need to engage directly with moral and political considerations; on the other view,
law’s role in practical reasoning is to engage people in moral and political questions.
The idea of law operates through exclusionary reasons is thus not a conceptual truth
about law but a reflection of a particular political theory. See Dan Priel, ‘Are
Jurisprudential Debates Conceptual? Some Evidence from Democratic Theory,’
(2012) 50 Osgoode Hall LJ.
46
See e.g., Frederick Schauer, ‘Formalism’ (1988) 97 Yale LJ 509 at 538-44; Cass
R Sunstein, ‘Must Formalism Be Defended Empirically?’ (1999) 66 U. Chi L Rev 636
at 641 (‘With some qualifications, my answer is “Yes.”’).
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(b) An Illustration: The Universality of the Common Law
When the fundamental difference in English and American law’s
conceptualization of the relationship between law and politics is brought to
light many of the differences between the two legal systems become clearer.
Some of the differences, such as English courts’ greater reluctance to enter
into issues that are politically contested, are in plain view;47 some, like
English courts’ greater adherence to precedent, go slightly deeper.48 Some go
deeper still: the issues that preoccupy legal debates, the very different style of
legal scholarship, the views regarding the relationship between the common
law and statute law, even the dominant jurisprudential theories. The
differences also have implications beyond the strict limits of legal doctrine; I
believe, for example, that the different approaches to legal education in the
two countries are, at least in part, explicable by this fundamental
distinction.49
Here I wish to highlight a less familiar issue explained by the different
attitude towards law and politics, namely the attitude toward the universality
of the common law. This difference is particularly relevant in the context of
restitution because much of the doctrinal work on unjust enrichment has
been a joint effort of scholars from all over the Commonwealth. This is no
coincidence. A fundamental idea that underlies, often quite explicitly, much
of the work of doctrinal scholars is that the common law is some kind of
single unified system, such that solutions reached in one legal system should
be largely the same as those in others.50 This is not treated merely as a
reflection of common historical origin, but as a fact of normative significance
such that divergences between common law jurisdictions are thought to be a
cause for concern in a way that, say, differences between English and French
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For a representative discussion of English judges’ attitude see, for example,
Patrick Devlin, The Judge (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978) at 6-7, where he
assesses the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1960s decisions and says that no English court
would have agreed to decide the issues American courts have dealt with.
48
See generally PS Atiyah & Robert S Summers, Form and Substance in AngloAmerican Law: A Comparative Study of Legal Reasoning, Legal Theory, and Legal
Institutions (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987) at 118-27.
49
See generally ibid at 388-98.
50
In somewhat different formulations this view is expressed in Nicholas J
McBride, ‘Duties of Care—Do They Really Exist’ (2004) 24 Oxford J Legal Stud 417
at 426, 429; Stevens, supra note 38 at 630-31; c.f. McInnes, supra note 5.
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law are not.51 This practice, importantly, is not the result of the ease of access
to judicial decisions in English, because American court decisions (and
American legal scholarship) are treated differently from decisions from the
rest of the English-speaking world. Likewise, divergences between English
law and American law are not considered a cause for alarm in the way that
divergences between English and Australian or Canadian courts are.52 From
the other direction, American courts do not usually care about legal
developments in common law jurisdictions outside the U.S, and most
American legal academics are similarly uninterested in non-U.S. law and
legal scholarship.
The political significance of all this has not been fully appreciated. For
the doctrinal scholar the experiences of other common law jurisdictions do
not merely provide a host of examples and ideas. Rather, the common law is
in some deep sense a single legal system that adheres to the same principles.
And this conception of transnational common law is significant because it
provides support to the idea of the common law as non-political. The
Commonwealth countries are spread all over the globe and despite shared
historical origins, they are now independent political entities. If their
common law is common, this can only be because that law is governed by a
set of autonomous rules that transcend politics. This is the exact corollary of
the Birksian view that there are some correct principles of unjust enrichment
that common law courts and commentators are working together to identify.
Appealing to the law of another country is illegitimate abdication of
sovereignty if laws are a reflection of a political view; if, on the other hand,
law is perceived as a matter of expertise achieved through the elucidation
51

Stevens, supra note 50 at 630, calls doctrinal divergences among common law
jurisdictions ‘disturbing.’ By contrast influences from non-common law jurisdictions
with which Britain is in formal political union are treated as alien and undesirable.
See McBride, supra note 50 at 439-40; Stevens, supra note 38 at 341-47. Similarly,
the Quebec Civil Code—a law of one of Canada’s provinces—seems to interest
many Anglophone Canadian private lawyers less than new cases coming from
Australia or England.
52
It is easier perhaps to see how distinct this view of the common law as
something that transcends political and jurisdictional boundaries when contrasting it
with the view that conceives of every legal system’s laws as reflecting its nation’s
volksgeist. See Frederick Charles von Savigny, Of the Vocation of Our Age for
Legislation and Jurisprudence (Abraham Hayward trans., 1831) at 24-28. In the latter
the law (the ius commune, literally the ‘common law’) emerges from the ‘people’ and
thus cannot be properly transferred to other nations.
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and refinement of law’s autonomous principles, then such worries are
misplaced. For proponents of this view the combined efforts of judges and
lawyers in these jurisdictions are the proof, and the guarantee, that private
law remains distinct from politics.
This attitude explains both why Commonwealth lawyers find American
law a less appropriate source for citation, and why Americans, in turn, are
reluctant to cite the cases of other jurisdictions. From the Commonwealth
lawyer’s perspective American decisions are less ‘eligible’ for citation exactly
because law in the U.S. is more self-consciously political. As such it is
difficult to see it as belonging to the same ideal of non-political law.53 Thus,
while the citation of an Australian decision by an English court in some sense
strengthens the sense of law as a non-political domain, the citation of
American decisions has the opposite effect by tainting the non-political
purity of Commonwealth common law.
For their part, American lawyers are much less willing to look to other
jurisdictions for inspiration or ideas. This reluctance is found across the
board: contract and tort are no different from constitutional or
administrative law; and common law jurisdictions are no different in this
regard from civil law jurisdictions. If all law is in some sense the product of
politics and the means for promoting political ends, then reliance on the law
of another country is prima facie illegitimate. Already in The Federalist
Papers James Madison wrote that ‘neither the common nor the statute law of
[England], or of any other nation, ought to be a standard for proceedings of
this [nation], unless previously made its own by legislative adoption,’54 that is
53

More precisely, the move away from doctrinal scholarship and a non-political
view of law has begun around the 1940s. It is therefore not uncommon to see
citation to American materials from that period. This is particularly true in the area
of unjust enrichment, where much of the impetus for the modern development
came from the U.S. Until the 1930s American courts used to regularly cite English
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unless it has been accepted in a process that guarantees its political
legitimacy. Consequently, law should reflect the political values and culture
of the jurisdiction in which it was created.55 Indeed, even when agreeing on
substantive outcomes with some other jurisdiction, the idea that American
lawyers should aim to align their law with that of countries, or that they have
some cause for concern if it does not, would strike many of them as
preposterous.56

IV. The Effects of the Relationship between Law and
Politics on Restitution Law and Scholarship
The last section has taken us very far afield. It is time to go back to the
discussion with which we started. Recall that we were trying to explain two
questions, not just one: first, why restitution law does not play a significant
role in American law; and second, why American scholars did not develop
much theoretical work on restitution along the lines of the scholarship that
now dominates American work on tort or contract law. I hope that at least
the outlines of the answer should by now be reasonably clear. In sections (a)
and (b) I discuss it in more detail and explain in what ways it is different
from the answer given by Saiman and Langbein. Sections (c) and (d) explain
two additional puzzles: first, I consider those issues on which one does find
some work on restitution by American scholars and explain why
Commonwealth doctrinal scholars have been largely silent or dismissive
scientific approach to law. See Gordon S Wood, The Radicalism of the American
Revolution (New York: Vintage, 1993) at 322-24, who describes the ‘most dramatic
institutional transformation in the early Republic,’ where ‘law became more and
more of a science removed from politics.’ During this period English and American
law were thought very similar. See e.g. AV Dicey, ‘A Common Citizenship for the
English Race’ (1897) 71 Contemporary Rev 457 at 469-71. Erie Railroad, supra note
45, is a useful signpost for the re-emergence of earlier approach.
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about them; and second, I offer an explanation of existing debates among
restitution scholars in the Commonwealth, which are often presented as
competing attempts to explain the ‘nature’ of restitution, but which I believe
are better understood as reflecting different views on the relationship
between law and politics.

(a) Explaining the Difference between American and English
Attitudes to Restitution
With some simplification the view I associated with English law can be
summarized syllogistically as follows:
(1) Law and politics, properly understood, are mutually exclusive.
(2) Therefore a political answer to a problem is, by definition, not a
legal one.
(3) Abolition of entrenched doctrines is a political kind of change.
(4) Therefore it is one that only the legislature can bring about.
(5) Therefore, it is one that is unavailable to the lawyer.
This forms part of the worldview, or what I called earlier the ideology of the
English legal system, against which restitution lawyers were working.
Nonetheless, faced with situations where existing legal categories resulted in
outcomes that were deemed unjust but based on ‘trite law’ that seemed
beyond change, a legal solution was sometimes felt to be needed. Restitution
provided the answer, and it proved particularly useful because it has at its
core an element that allows for its unlimited expansion. The most important
element within the unjust enrichment model is that of an ‘unjust factor.’ A
successful plaintiff must be able to show that the defendant’s enrichment at
her expense falls under of several recognized unjust factors or else her claim
will fail. The list is made up of a hodgepodge of considerations that have
little in common especially once we account for the so-called ‘policymotivated’ unjust factors.57 Within the alternative civilian analysis
(embraced by Birks shortly before he died) and favoured in certain
Commonwealth jurisdictions (most prominently Canada), what needs to be
shown is lack of legal basis, a notion that is equally open-ended.58
Thus, the very feature that makes unjust enrichment attractive—its
ability to keep the law in line with common sense morality—is what makes it
57
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a potential threat to the entire doctrinal edifice, and the separation of law
from politics. One sees this tension in debates among English lawyers about
the principle of unjust enrichment. For a long time there was resistance to
the idea that such a principle was part of the common law: one judge
described it as a ‘well-meaning sloppiness of thought,’59 and as late as 1977
we were told by the House of Lords that a general principle of unjust
enrichment (as opposed to ‘specific remedies in particular cases’) is not
recognized in English law.60 These sceptics were not opposed to some of the
doctrines now subsumed under this heading (such as the doctrine that the
recipient of a mistaken payment ought to give it up), but rather to the
introduction of a category, which despite good intentions, was not
sufficiently constraining. In terms of the present discussion the perceived
danger was that unjust enrichment’s doctrinal open-endedness would bring
down the separation of law from politics. It is exactly for this reason,
therefore, that the defenders of unjust enrichment have been so insistent
that unjust enrichment, despite appearances, has little to do with justice, and
why they tried to show just how much the law has shed its older loose and
vague formulations to become a doctrinally respectable area in which ‘the
judges simply ask themselves “is this enrichment unjust?”’, and this question
is determined as ‘a matter of law’.61 Many of the seemingly purely doctrinal
debates in this area of law are, in part, a reflection of this tension between
the desire to keep the doctrine loose enough to serve the role of solving
problems in other areas of law but not too loose as to undermine its doctrinal
respectability.
If I am right about this, then it is not difficult to see why restitution law
(and the principle against unjust enrichment) played a much more
significant role within English (and Commonwealth) law than it has in
American law in the last fifty or so years. The primary motivation for unjust
enrichment law was a felt need to circumvent various doctrines that were
thought to lead to unjust results but were also considered too entrenched to
eliminate. Unjust enrichment was new and thus sufficiently malleable, and it
was perhaps inherently somewhat looser than other areas of law. It could be
59
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applied to a much broader range of situations than either tort or contract.
And with sufficient doctrinal work it was considered sufficiently ‘legal’ to
assuage fears of the politicization of private law.62
The American story is different. To the extent that American courts and
academics were still trying to maintain the separation of law from politics,
they still had some use for restitution, although even here they were probably
less concerned with precedent or doctrinal constraints than their English
counterparts. (It is therefore not a coincidence that this doctrinal innovation
was imported into Commonwealth law from the United States.) But as the
idea of law being separate from politics was largely abandoned, so was the
interest in the reasoned elaboration of doctrine. American courts still
continued to base their judgments on traditional doctrinal materials (even
though they have always been much more sympathetic to academic work
than English courts),63 but they did so while openly acknowledging the
underlying normative considerations at stake, and they showed greater
willingness to abandon old doctrines that did not seem fitting to changing
times. Thus, for instance, in the U.S. the solution to the problem of the
battle of the forms mentioned above was achieved by changing the rules on
offer and acceptance and was classified as part of contract law. The famous
section 2-207 of the Uniform Commercial Code maintains that under
62
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certain conditions a contract may be formed even when the acceptance is in
a form that introduces changes to the offer. Similar ideas were adopted long
before by the courts.64 And even if courts had to base their judgments on
doctrine, there was no reason for academics to constrain themselves in this
way. American legal academics have come to see themselves as engaged in
normative debates on what the law should be, and on these matters doctrine
has come to be perceived as a somewhat sinister means of obscuring the real
(normative, political) issues at stake. It was thus difficult to see how
engaging in doctrinal scholarship could provide real help in addressing the
issues the courts face.65
All this only makes the question posed in the beginning even more
pertinent. If American law is much more concerned with engaging people
with moral and political questions, why did American academic lawyers not
turn to normative, ‘theoretical’ work on unjust enrichment in the way they
did with contract or tort law? The answer should by now be clear: unjust
enrichment law was a product of the particular need to solve legal problems
in a particular way. It was a solution to an essentially legal problem, but those
who were no hampered by this problem, had relatively little need for it. If it
is accepted that a main role of unjust enrichment law was to solve problems
in other areas of law, the American lawyer’s response would more likely have
been: let’s change the original law. Why add a layer of doctrinal complexity,
when the source of the problem can be removed more directly? Even if the
courts sometimes marched to a similar beat as their Commonwealth
counterparts,66 for academics, there was simply no intellectual problem to
64
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solve. If some doctrines pose a problem, well, ‘Off with their heads!’ At the
higher level of theoretical abstraction, unjust enrichment could not add
much to the discussion on the appropriate boundaries of property rights, on
what is considered a ‘taking,’ on the normative implications of autonomy,
fairness, or efficiency, but by and large the principle of unjust enrichment
was not perceived as helpful in addressing them. In other words, the reason
there was relatively little non-doctrinal unjust enrichment scholarship was
that it was not perceived to have much non-doctrinal intellectual meat.

(b) The Place of Legal Realism
Superficially, all this fits the realist story told by Saiman and Langbein. Many
of the realists denounced the kind of conceptualism that is a token of
doctrinal scholarship. Felix Cohen, most famously, scathingly attacked the
idea that there is some conceptual truth to be discovered about legal
questions.67 ‘Title’ was one of his examples of ‘legal nonsense,’ a view he
shared with Karl Llewellyn who thought legal title was a ‘mystical’ idea.68
Less famously, but just as importantly, Cohen attacked the idea that legal
criticism is in some sense based on logic: the only significant basis for legal
criticism, he said, was that the law was morally wrong.69 Such a view often
translates to contempt towards what is sometimes called ‘juridical reason,’
especially if one believes that legal doctrine alone cannot provide a very
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strong constraint on a judge’s ability to get to the outcome she wants. This,
famously, is also something that many legal realists believed.70
In truth, however, the story is more complex, because to the extent that
legal doctrine is nowadays less important in the United States than in
England, putting the blame (or the praise) on the realists ignores the
background described above about law and politics. As I see it, the realist
attack on legal concepts is grounded in a particular view about the
relationship between law and politics. It is grounded either in rejection of the
view that legal rules are there to keep lawyers and political considerations
apart, or in the view that if that is the aim of legal rules, they fail miserably in
this task. On this point, I believe, the legal realists, or more precisely their
success and lasting influence in the United States, are the effect, not the
cause. Put differently, to invoke the legal realists’ dislike for doctrinal
scholarship as the reason for American lawyers’ lack of interest in
contemporary doctrinal work on restitution is not to offer an answer to the
question, but merely to restate it. What must be explained are the origins of
legal realism, and, especially in a comparative context, why its disparate
impact in different jurisdictions. The question is not, or not only, why legal
realism emerged in the United States and not elsewhere. The answer to this
question involves various intertwining factors, having to do with the earlier
professionalization of American universities, the early emergence of the
American law school as an integral part of the university system, and a ‘revolt
against formalism’71 that crossed disciplinary boundaries in American
universities at the time. But we should not forget that broadly similar realist
ideas emerged in many countries around the same time: in France François
Gény and Léon Duguit expressed such views, in Germany there was Jhering
and later the ‘free law’ movement,72 and in Scandinavia there was a parallel
‘realist’ movement to the American one.73 In fact, even England had its small
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band of ‘legal realists’ working around the same period that the American
legal realists came to prominence.74
The significant question is why despite all this, realist ideas have had
much greater staying power in the United States, where they have taken deep
root and have affected the way law is taught, researched and conceived, but
have had much weaker impact elsewhere. In the context of this essay the
interesting question is why, even after being shown the American example,
most English scholars remained not just unenthusiastic, but often openly
hostile to legal realism. Such questions obviously do not lend themselves to a
single, simple answer, but I believe an important ingredient in the answer has
to do with the different perceptions already existing (or emerging) at the time
on the respective roles of and relationships between law and politics in the
American and English (or British) political traditions.75 Realist ideas caught
on in the United States because the periods prior to their emergence saw
more overt ties between law and politics, especially, but not exclusively, in
constitutional law. While it is true that on the surface most legal realists
seemed relatively unconcerned with the question of the relationship between
law and politics and with the impact of judges’ political opinions on the
outcome of cases,76 I think it is this background that made realist ideas
appear a more adequate, and a more honest, description of the law. Then, in
a kind of feedback loop mechanism, legal realism may have made the
74
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connection between law and politics even more pronounced, until it was
made explicit by scholars writing a generation later.77
In one sense this claim will not come as news to lawyers: the differences
between the two countries in matters like parliamentary sovereignty, judicial
review, judicial engagement in politically-sensitive matters and so on are all
too obvious to ignore. But acknowledgement of these differences is usually
limited to public law. The point emerging from my account is that this is a
mistake. They are relevant to private law, because in a fundamental way they
are relevant to the very understanding of what counts as private law, and
perhaps more importantly to the question why something counts as private
law. In fact, the very distinction between private law and public law should
be understood as a product of the English view on the relationship between
law and politics, not as its source. By contrast, the very different conception
of the relationship between law and politics which explains why American
lawyers have long considered the distinction between private and public law
suspect.78
I might still be challenged that what looks like a great divide is only a
mirage, a reflection of the particular (or peculiar) interests of American
academic lawyers. According to this view on both sides of the Atlantic lawyers
rely on restitutionary ideas in roughly equal measure, but it is American legal
academics’ lack of interest in doctrinal questions that obscures the rather
similar state of the law.79 There are several responses to this suggestion. First,
even if it is entirely true, we are still left with a puzzle—although perhaps a
less significant one—and that is why American academic lawyers are
relatively uninterested in writing on this area of law as opposed to their
English and Commonwealth counterparts. Second, despite the greater divide
between legal practice and academic law in the United States, there is an
inevitable connection between them. Those who end up in legal practice get
their first legal training in law school, and if one does not encounter unjust
77
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enrichment there, unjust enrichment may just not be part of the conceptual
toolbox she uses later in practice. Third and most important, virtually all of
those who have considered the U.S.–Commonwealth divide on unjust
enrichment have concluded that the differences are found not only in the
law reviews, but also in the law reports.

(c) Where Has American Law Seen Developments in
Restitution?
To further develop the point just made, I will return now to a matter that has
so far has only been briefly alluded to, but which I think fits the story told
here very well, and that is that there is actually some American scholarship
that invokes restitutionary ideas, but this work is very different from the
English and Commonwealth doctrinal work on unjust enrichment. For this
we need to distinguish between a cause of action in unjust enrichment and
restitutionary (gain-based) remedies. As a cause of action unjust enrichment
is discussed by American lawyers primarily in those areas in which it is
thought that existing legal doctrine contains a gap thought incapable of
addressing an existing injustice. To put the matter in somewhat rough terms,
whereas in English law unjust enrichment has been developed as a distinctly
legal supplement for solving problems with existing doctrines in other areas
of law that lawyers felt incapable of solving within those areas of law, for
American lawyers the main use for restitutionary ideas has been the
development of new grounds for liability where none existed before. Claims
for reparation for historical wrongs are a primary example.80 Central to this
understanding of unjust enrichment is the view that the ‘soul of unjust
enrichment … includes flexibility, creativity, justice and morality
underpinnings, and discretion.’81 It should not come as a surprise that
doctrinal English lawyers who relied on restitution primarily for correcting
problems with existing doctrines in other parts of private law have not been
80
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enthusiastic about extending restitution in that direction.82 One such critic
has even contrasted doctrinal scholars’ commitment to the ‘principle of
unjust enrichment’ with the ‘politics’ that underlies the restitutionary ideas
he found in the United States.83
The other area where we have seen some American interest is the
question of restitution as a remedy, and this too is consistent with the view I
outlined above. Within the approach favoured by Commonwealth lawyers,
there is a conceptual connection between particular types of claim and
particular remedies, and as a result the area of remedies has remained
relatively undeveloped. In American law, there was a reversal of roles. The
content of one’s rights (or, as they became more neutrally to be called,
‘entitlements’) has come to be seen as determined by the remedies one could
get for their violation. This led academic lawyers to explore the question of
remedies at levels of sophistication unmatched by (and largely unknown to)
Commonwealth lawyers.84 And it is here that the possibility of a remedy
based on the defendant’s gain rather than the plaintiff’s loss (as opposed to
the question whether there is a distinct domain of ‘unjust enrichment’), has
attracted some attention. But this attention is likely to disappoint friends of
unjust enrichment: the question of whether there is room for gain-based
remedies is one that can be raised alongside a broad range of remedies that
could all be attached to different claims, whether these are classified as
belonging to contract, torts, patent violation, ‘unjust enrichment,’ or
anything else. Therefore, the sort of arguments utilized in deciding whether
to award or withhold such remedies are analyzed largely in consequentialist
terms and touch on considerations that English proponents of unjust
enrichment are likely to consider alien to the subject.85
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Saiman notices this point and ascribes this break between rights and
remedies to legal realism.86 Loosely speaking, the connection is correct,
although once again the picture is more complex.87 Here too I think a more
complete explanation has to include the main thesis of this essay about the
location of law with regard to politics. The view that sees a conceptual
connection between certain legal rights and certain legal remedies is
apolitical to the extent that it denies that available legal remedies should be
determined according to normative judgments external to legal concepts.
Birks provided a clear statement of this view in the context of considering the
issue of priority among creditors in insolvency. He rejected the view that this
matter should be determined by an attempt at assessing which solution
would lead to better consequences. As he put it, ‘[f]or my part I find it
difficult to say who deserves to suffer or which groups deserve to suffer more
than others. Giving an answer to changing the answer already given seems to
be precisely the kind of issue which has to be left to the legislature.’88 These are
the sort of considerations that a political body should take, and as such they
are beyond the remit of legal argument. According to the approach Birks
favoured ‘the business of the lawyer can only be to say with as much
precision as possible on what facts proprietary interests arise.’89 This view
makes much sense as both a statement of the separateness of law and
politics, and as a strategy for keeping them like that.
Understanding rights in terms of remedies—understanding legal
entitlements as the sum total of the remedies they can give rise to—is easier
to accept when law is understood in broadly political terms. On this view the
appropriate remedy is not determined by its ‘form,’ by correct location of the
event in question on the legal ‘map.’ Instead, legal rights are thought of as
nothing more than entitlements to certain legal protections, and the limits of
those legal protections are determined by political considerations that legal
doctrine cannot provide. This does not necessarily mean that judges will
86
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always undertake a detailed cost-benefit analysis in search of the optimal
remedy in every individual case. They may not have the means or data to do
that (and it is here that legal scholars may come to their aid); but it does
mean that there is no principled argument against, say, taking deterrence
considerations into account when deciding whether to award restitutionary
remedies or not, and it does mean that in practice, remedies will be subject
to the impact of political argument unmediated by legal form. From a
doctrinal perspective this is conceptual confusion and a dangerous
development in that it undermines the division between law and politics.
From the opposite perspective, legal categories are tools to be used for the
sake of promoting normative goals. This is precisely the approach one finds
much more often among American restitution scholars and American
courts.90

(d) A Note on the Debates among Restitution Lawyers
The argument developed above was mainly focused on the difference in
modern attitudes to restitution in England (and to varying degrees the rest of
the Commonwealth) and the United States; but I think it can also help us
understand existing debates among English (and Commonwealth)
restitution scholars. Those are often presented as debates about the ‘nature’
of restitution or of the common law. On one side stand those who adopt the
broadly Birksian position, who insist on the reality of unjust enrichment, and
on the other stand the unjust enrichment sceptics, some of whom doubt
whether this area unjust enrichment law even exists. Consider, once again,
the case of mistaken payment. The question—whether the recipient should
give up the money received—is simple, as is the legal outcome. The
competing explanations offered as to why are, nonetheless, very different,
although they too are not very difficult to understand. Where, then, does all
the disagreement come from?
One characteristic aspect of the debate, at times amusing but more often
frustrating, is the disparity in the kinds of arguments used and the sources
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See generally Dagan, Restitution, supra note 10. Dagan is, unsurprisingly,
unenthusiastic about the ‘unjust enrichment’ label, see ibid at 25-26, and explicitly
identifies his subject as concerned with gain-based remedies. See ibid at 26 (‘I
suggest viewing unjust enrichment as a loose framework…. By a loose framework I
mean a mere placeholder for arranging and classifying legal rules that involve
benefit-based liability or benefit-based recovery and that—for whatever reason—do
not find a comfortable home in another field.’).
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used to substantiate them. Proponents of the proprietary approach often
invoke broadly moral and political considerations; their respondents then
answer by appealing to cases.91 Each side finds the other’s way of arguing for
their outcome puzzling. This difference becomes less puzzling once it is
realized that the two sides to the debate are committed to different views on
the proper way of developing and improving the law. I am confident that if
the matter were to be examined empirically, it would be found that there is
strong correlation between those who think that unjust enrichment is a real
legal category and the view that the development of law must be based on
the analysis and elaboration of legal materials, whereas those who are critical
of unjust enrichment tend to the view that law must primarily be explained
and justified by appeal to external moral standards. For those in the second
group the fact that one can find cases that mention unjust enrichment is
largely irrelevant to the question whether unjust enrichment ‘exists.’ In
considering the structure of the law our primary consideration is matching
the law not with doctrine, but with moral and political principles. From this
perspective, the principle of unjust enrichment appears largely superfluous.
So here we have one important moral for those engaged in the debates
on the status of unjust enrichment: until you agree on the question of law
and politics, the likelihood of one side adducing arguments that the other is
likely to find potentially convincing, or even relevant—the likelihood, in
other words, of genuine debate—is small indeed. Since it is unlikely that an
answer to this question will be forthcoming any time soon, the question of
the ‘nature’ of unjust enrichment is likely to remain equally contested.

Conclusion
In most comparative discussions English and American law are still treated as
belonging to one ‘family,’ one legal tradition, one that in fact is quite often
called the ‘Anglo-American’ legal tradition. In some respects no doubt the
classification is still valid and valuable, but on some issues it can be
misleading. The question considered in this essay is one of those. The
explanation offered here for their divergence on unjust enrichment is that
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Consider: ‘whatever the position Hedley’s attacks on the unjust enrichment
school of thought first started, the judicial tide of opinion has turned in favour of
explicitly applying the unjust enrichment principle.’ Burrows, supra note 18 at 35. I
suspect those in the other group will not consider this argument relevant, let alone
decisive.
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answering this question requires not simply stating that doctrinal scholarship
has become much less popular in the U.S. than in England, but rather
explaining why this happened. The answer offered here is, first, that largely
through the work of doctrinal scholars restitution law has come to occupy in
English law the role of resolving problems in areas in which legal doctrine
seemed to lead to unjust results but was thought too deeply entrenched for
change. It then argued that such ossification of doctrine was possible because
of a particular conception of the common law as non-political, one that in
turn was believed to impose certain limits on the sort and scope of legal
change courts can bring about. The rise of unjust enrichment in English law
was, then, explained as a solution to an internal legal problem that is the
result of the normative foundations of English law and its conceptualization
in relation to politics. It is this conceptualization that has been largely
abandoned in the United States, and with its demise the need for developing
unjust enrichment as a distinct legal category declined as well. This fact itself
has a complex relationship with legal realism, but my argument has sought to
show that it cannot be fully explained as caused by legal realism; rather, at
least to some extent it predates it and is better understood as one of the
causes of legal realism, or rather of its lasting success.
The essay has also touched on more abstract questions, of which I wish
to highlight two. One is the question of the relationship between law and
politics. It should be clear that I reject the view that these two domains are as
a conceptual matter separate just as much as I reject the view that as a
conceptual matter they are tied. Rather, as I have sought to show my view is
that there are various ways of understanding their relationship resulting in
different understandings of what law is. The other is the divide that exists in
legal philosophy between the search for what is called, misleadingly I think,
‘the nature of law’ on the one hand, and the theoretical questions relating to
particular areas of law on the other hand. The former inquiry is typically
presented as conceptual and morally neutral whereas the latter as normative,
and as such the two seem to be relatively independent of each other. I reject
this this divide, because I believe both should be understood as part of one
political inquiry. As the present essay has shown normative choices at the
level of the ‘nature’ of law have normative implications on what particular
areas of law look like.
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